Rousseau and inequality

Rousseau and inequality:
liberty and inequality in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Ralph Harrington
BA (Lond.), MSt (Oxon.), DPhil (Oxon.)

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AT THE HEART of Rousseau’s political philosophy is his condemnation of inequality. Rousseau detested inequality because he saw it as a result of a misdirection of human development at an early stage, and as the cause of the evils which he saw in society – dependence, pride, vanity, the gap between the rich and poor. His political thought has been called ‘an exercise in indignation’,[1] and it is inequality above all which causes him to be indignant. He sets out a detailed theoretical explanation of how inequality may have arisen in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), while his ideas on how society could be organised to overcome inequality are expounded in the Social Contract (1762); inequality as a theme is present in several of his other important works, notably in Emile (1762) and Julie (1761), but it is within the former two works that his thoughts on the subject are most fully considered. His central aim in both the Discourse and the Social Contract is not to provide the blueprint for the creation of a perfect world but to assert that society as it actually exists is deeply unjust and fundamentally unnatural, and that a better alternative is conceivable.

From the outset, Rousseau is concerned to clarify the nature of that inequality which he condemns; most importantly, he makes clear his belief that the inequalities of society are not natural by defining them as ‘artificial’ inequalities and distinguishing them from the inherent differences between individuals’ skills and attributes. He does not attempt to claim that inequalities are not naturally present between people; what he rejects is the notion that such natural inequalities have any importance when man is living in his natural state: ‘inequality is hardly perceived in state of nature, and ... its influence there is almost nil’ (DI, 105*). The process through which humanity has reached its unhappy condition is essentially, as described by Rousseau, the transformation of harmless natural inequality ‘through the effects of instituted inequality’ (DI, 105) into the most harmful and corrupting influence on human society.

Rousseau begins his analysis with the state of nature, and he is very concerned not to attribute to his ‘natural man’ any social or civilised accomplishments whatsoever; he criticises other philosophers, particularly, by implication, Thomas Hobbes, for having ‘transported into the state of nature concepts [such as oppression, desire, pride] formed in society ... they speak of savage man and they depict civilised man’ (DI, 78). Rousseau sets out to strip man down to the essentials of his nature; he sees natural man as ‘an animal, less strong than some, less agile than others, but taken as a whole the most advantageously organised of all’ (DI, 81), but set apart from the beasts with whom he shares the earth by two characteristics. First, man is free, in three senses: he possesses free will, and is not subject to instinct as an animal is; he is free from any form of political authority; and he is not subject to the will of any other man. This latter point is of central importance to Rousseau, for the enslavement of one individual by another is for him the most objectionable manifestation of inequality, and is entirely a product of civilisation; men in the state of nature ‘could hardly even be brought to understand what servitude and domination are’ (DI, 106). The second characteristic is perfectibilité. This attribute as understood by Rousseau carries no suggestion that mankind is developing towards perfection, or is perfectible; it is simply a capacity for self-improvement. Rousseau would deny, however, that mankind has made use of this capacity to improve at all, for it is this characteristic which has led man out of his natural state towards social development, bringing about human decline into vice and corruption.

The first step out of the state of nature is seen by Rousseau as the point at which man abandons a wandering lifestyle and elects to establish permanent settlements. It is this stage which sees the evolution of the first and most basic social grouping, the family. Despite the attractive description given by Rousseau of this level of ‘nascent society’, the gradual movement of humanity away from its natural condition of inherent equality and harmony towards the artificiality and corruption of civilisation has begun, for the appearance of family groups and, through each individual’s new sense of the possession of his own home, of ‘property of a sort’ (DI, 112) foreshadows the appearance of artificial inequality. There is some ambiguity in Rousseau’s argument as to whether humanity could have remained in the state of nascent society, or whether further decline into more advanced and unequal societies was inevitable; the form in which he suggests society developed from a nascent stage tends to indicate that further decline and the rise of inequality was inevitable once humanity had taken the first step away from its natural state.

Rousseau suggests that the move from nascent society took place as a result of population increase, which led to a shortage of resources. This did not directly bring about conflict, but caused people to join together in groups larger than the family to hunt more effectively for food; the psychological consequence of this was profound, with each man and woman ‘ceasing in the context of the family to be a solitary person, [becoming] in the context of society an egoistic person’.[2] These groups inevitably associated, and as people met and socialised in ever larger groups they ‘became accustomed to judging different objects and making comparisons’ (DI, 114); the concepts of preference and merit were born, and inequality between individuals became established. The same circumstances gave rise to pride (amour-propre) and the desire to excel:

Each began to look at the others and to wants to be looked at himself ... He who sang or dance the best; he who was the most handsome, the strongest, the most adroit or the most eloquent became the most highly regarded ... (DI, 114)

Rousseau is unequivocal about the significance of this development: ‘this was the first step towards inequality and vice’ (DI, 114). The harmony and innocence of man’s natural condition of self-love (amour de soi-même) and equality is exchanged for the social vices of pride and inequality; whereas natural man lives within himself, social man lives increasingly in the estimation of others.

Thus, claims Rousseau, the phenomenon of artificial inequality was born. The particular inequalities which he criticised, however, were basically economic in nature; above all he condemned the gap between rich and poor:

it is manifestly contrary to the law of nature, however defined... that a handful of people should gorge themselves with superfluities while the hungry multitude goes in want of necessities. (DI, 137)

This is not merely one manifestation of inequality, but the underlying cause of the corruption of society which Rousseau detested. In this sense it is correct to call this economic inequality ‘the original source of inequality, that precedes political organisation, [and] remains the root of all social evil’.[3]

It was through the appearance of agriculture and metallurgy that the inequalities which Rousseau believes to be the most destructive of freedom and contrary to nature developed. As long as men restricted themselves to work which did not require collaboration they remained ‘free, healthy, good and happy as nature allowed’; but ‘from the instant that one man needed the help of another, and it was found to be useful for one man to have provisions enough for two, equality disappeared’ (DI, 116). this process also led to the introduction of the ‘fatal concept’ of property, as a man who had laboured to cultivate an area of land made claim to its ownership. Inequality of possessions led to conflict, and nascent society, ‘the happiest epoch and the most lasting’ (DI, 115) gave way to ‘the most horrible state of war’ (DI, 120). It was to end this condition of conflict that men first came together contractually to establish a civil society; but the social contract Rousseau describes in the discourse is unjust, a fraudulent contract imposed on the poor by the rich to protect their position. Thus inequality is made permanent, and indeed is the basis of society as Rousseau sees it.

This being the case, is there any way in which the evil influence of inequality on human existence can be overcome? Rousseau does not claim that the clock can simply be turned back; natural man, once socialised, cannot be de-socialised. in any case, Rousseau does not seem to think that would be desirable, for in the Social Contract – in which his view of the state of nature is rather less positive than it is in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality – he states that man only really becomes human on entering politically organised society. Although in entering civil society man loses some of the advantages of a savage state, he gains in return far greater advantages, so that ‘he should constantly bless the happy hour that lifted him for ever from the state of nature and from the narrow, stupid animal made a creature of intelligence and a man’ (SC, 65). Nor does Rousseau simply call for an egalitarian society; he is opposed to inequality, but is not a particular advocate of equality. He suggests that though the dependence of a servant on his master must be abolished, the distance between them socially would still remain; he wished ‘to transform grandeur into paternity’.[4] Rousseau seems to see some social distinctions as natural inequalities, in the same way as he regards different levels of strength and agility. His contempt for the aristocracy did not mean that he was a social revolutionary; indeed, he tends to support ‘the preservation of the poor in a situation where their natural virtues were at least partly shielded from the perversions of civilisation’.[5] In other words, poverty and purity is preferable to plenty and perversion.

Thus the means of overcoming inequality is not to be found in simply reversing the process of social development which has created artificial inequalities; rather, it lies in the recognition that, just as it is a cultural process which has given rise to harmful inequalities, so a more moral cultural process can counteract them. Rousseau sets out to hypothesise a state based on a moral and just constitution, for only within such a state can inequality – which is ineradicable – be restricted and made acceptable. His hypothesis is contained in the Social Contract.

Rousseau is quite explicit about what the aims of a just state should be: ‘the goal of every system of law... comes down to two main objects, freedom and equality’ (SC, 96). He attempts to balance these two objects in the state by founding it not on the concept of a people who submit to being rule, but on the ideal of a people ruling itself. This he does by basing his sovereignty on popular will; the people establish a system of law which comprises the state, specific action in particular cases being taken on their behalf by a ‘Legislator’ who can guide the people if they are mistaken in their decisions – as Rousseau admits they may well be. The expression of the people’s sovereignty, and the basis of the state’s legitimacy, is the concept of the General Will.

The General Will works to prevent the development of inequalities by reintroducing into civil society the pre-social harmony which existed in the state of nature. Inequality is harmful, and as there can be no question of the people acting to harm itself, the General Will always tends towards equality. In practice, Rousseau recommends a number of specific policies which the Legislator, acting in accordance with the General Will, can pursue to overcome inequality; thus he indicates very strongly that state intervention would be required to prevent the growth of private property leading to inequalities of wealth, ensuring that no claimant to the ownership of land ‘occupies more than he needs for subsistence’ (SC, 66). He also emphasises the importance of universal justice and absolute equality before the law. Above all he makes clear the importance of resisting the natural tendency of every individual citizen to seek to pursue their selfish and particular wills. This is established in the initial covenant which creates the society, which requires ‘the total alienation by each associate of himself and his rights to the whole community’ (SC, 60). Particular wills tend inevitably to inequality and must therefore be entirely subservient to the General Will. Furthermore, no associations and groupings within the state can be permitted, as there must be no rival loyalties for the citizen to his citizenship – another aspect of potential inequality. He asserts the importance of ensuring ‘a large measure of equality and social rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority will not last long’ (SC, 113).

Within this framework, how successfully does Rousseau overcome the inequality which he says is inevitable and ineradicable, but which must be combated and restricted? The structure of authority and democracy which he lays down does promise of considerable agree of effectiveness against inequality, but fails adequately to preserve the other essential aim of the just state, liberty. Rousseau’s overriding concern with expressing the will of the majority, on the grounds that any minority resisting it is not only wrong, but tending towards inequality, is fundamentally totalitarian.

* References to Rousseau’s works are given in round brackets with titles abbreviated as follows: DI=Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, SC=The Social Contract. The page numbers given refer to the editions cited in the bibliography.

© Ralph Harrington 2005. This work is protected by copyright and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivative Works 3.0 Licence. This means that you can copy, distribute and transmit this work freely as long as it is attributed to the original author; you may not alter, transform or build upon this work; and you may not use this work for commercial purposes.

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Notes

1. J. N. Shklar, Men and Citizens, p. 30.

2. Maurice Cranston, Philosophers and Pamphleteers, p. 73

3. Shklar, Men and Citizens, p. 95.

4. Shklar, Men and Citizens, p. 31.

5. Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment, p. 215.

Bibliography

Works by Rousseau

A Discourse on Inequality (1755), transl. & ed. Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin, 1984)

The Social Contract (1762), transl. & ed. Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin, 1968)

Some further reading

D. Cameron, The Social Thought of Rousseau and Burke (London: Weidenfeld, 1973)

Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964)

Maurice Cranston, Philosophers and Pamphleteers: Political Theorists of the Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)

J. C. Hall, Rousseau: An Introduction to his Political Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1973)

Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment (London: Pelican, 1968, repr. 1982)

M. Lessnoff, Social Contract (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986)

G. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (London: Harrap, 1937; 3rd edn.1951)

J. N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)