Mill and liberty

Mill and liberty:
individual liberty, government and society in the thought of John Stuart Mill

Ralph Harrington
BA (Lond.), MSt (Oxon.), DPhil (Oxon.)

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JOHN STUART MILL opens his essay On Liberty with a phrase from the Prussian linguist, civil servant, political thinker and polymath Wilhelm von Humboldt, identifying the ‘grand, leading principle’ of the subsequent argument as ‘the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity’ (OL, 3*). This choice of epigram reveals the unique value and importance accorded by Mill to his conception of individual liberty. For Mill, the prerequisite for the rich and diverse development of humanity is freedom, enabling each individual to seek out and explore his or her own individual ‘path of life’. The only source of potential within society for continued human development is contained in the creativity and spontaneity of individuals; thus the liberty of the individual, expressing the most fundamental characteristic of human nature, is at the heart of Mill’s social and political philosophy.

However, despite the vigour of Mill’s support for freedom, the liberty of the individual is not an absolute in moral or ethical terms. Mill’s conception of liberty remains essentially utilitarian: he argues for the widest application of individual liberty because it allows the greatest measure of happiness to be sought most effectively. His concern is not to assert liberty as a natural right, but to set out the proper constraints within which ‘Civil, or Social Liberty’ can be exploited and expressed by the individual without hindrance from external agents; and, having defined the scope of unhindered individual liberty, to clarify ‘the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual’ (OL, 5). Mill’s chief preoccupations in this respect are to defend liberty against the encroaching pressures of society, which he discusses in his essay On Liberty, and the related threat posed by the effects of certain forms of government, analysed in Considerations on Representative Government. His consistent aim is to balance the conflicting demands of the individual and society with the minimum of compromise to the nature of individual liberty.

The high value Mill places on individual liberty is clear throughout his works, as is his contention that liberty generally is undervalued as a part of human nature and human existence. He writes in On Liberty that the main difficulty in maintaining the principle that the liberty of the individual should be the basis of the rule of conduct ‘does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself’ (OL, 57). Mill is concerned to assert the central importance of individual character in creating the conditions for human progress; in the same passage, he goes on to stress the value of individuality as ‘one of the leading essentials of well-being ... not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilisation, instruction, education, culture, but ... itself a necessary part and condition of all those things’ (OL, 57). Mill respects the potential of human beings to be morally responsible, creative, independent subjects, and is strongly critical of any hindrance to the development of that potential; for, he contends, it is only through unrestrained originality and spontaneity that society develops and is enriched. In other words, any form of progress for a society is dependent upon the liberty of the individuals who compose it.

Given that the cultivation of individual liberty is of such importance as the basis for the greatest degree of happiness – the only criterion for judging the success of any way of life – but is nevertheless not a moral or ethical absolute but a condition which must be realized in the real world, Mill attempts to frame a general rule which can govern the extent to which an individual’s liberty can be interfered with by external forces such as society and government. The result is his famous ‘very simple principle’, which asserts:

that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number. is self-protection ... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. (OL, 13)

Mill’s distinction between ‘self-regarding’ and ‘not self-regarding’ actions is the outcome of this principle; the implication is that government need only concern itself with the sphere of an individual’s activities in which others are affected by those activities – and then to do so as little as possible. This concept makes for great convenience in argument, appearing to distinguish clearly between the areas of the lives of individuals in which government can intervene, and the areas which are beyond any justified intervention. In practice, however, the attempt to draw the line of division is beset with complication and inevitable compromise, because it is by no means easy to distinguish between the actions of an individual which involve others and those which do not. The difficulties which arise, and the extent to which Mill is forced to accept a degree of compromise which comes close to entirely undermining his basic principle, becomes clear in an analysis of his views of the nature and role of government, and its relationship with the individual.

As has been mentioned, the threats which Mill perceives to individual liberty come from both society and government. It is important to note, however, that the two themes of the pressure of custom and conformity in society and the development of over-powerful interventionist government, forming together ‘a mass of influences hostile to Individuality’ (OL, 73) are intimately connected. Both ultimately derive from Mill’s general concern at the levelling, unifying, stagnating characteristics of human society as a whole: ‘the threat to liberty which Mill chiefly feared was not government but a majority that is intolerant of the unconventional, that looks with suspicion on divergent minorities’.[1] Mill opposed the ‘tyranny of the majority’, the tendency towards mediocrity and conformity inherent in democracy – which, as a potentially ‘despotic’ system of government, he disliked more than aristocratic or monarchical despotism, as he felt it would more effectively employ the most powerful tool of social concern, public opinion. In his theory of government, Mill is therefore deeply conscious of the need to restrain the anti-individualistic impulses of democracy, restricting the extent to which government can become the tool of an authoritarian majority.

This is where Mill’s theory throws up the paradox which undermines his attempts to preserve an inalienable sphere of individual liberty in an ordered society. Ultimately, the solution to the reconciliation of individual liberty with collective existence lies in the creation of a society in which the anti-individualistic, anti-liberal tendencies Mill identified in his own and previous societies are not present – in other words, ‘behind a liberal government there must be a liberal society’.[2] Such a society can only develop when its citizens are mature, educated, strong and vigorous in character, expressing ‘the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control. It is through the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests’ (OL, 60). A government is a failure if ‘it does not concentrate in the hands of the authorities, power sufficient to fulfil the necessary offices of a government’; but it also fails if ’it does not sufficiently develop by exercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual citizens’ (RG, 229). Mill therefore insists on the need for participatory government, for ‘the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state, is one in which the whole people participate’ (RG, 198). Despotic rulers may demand submission from their peoples, but ‘no men are mere instruments or materials in the hands of their rulers’ (RG, 195), and to repress the individuality and creativity of men and women is to go against human nature itself:

Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing. (OL, 60)

Mill accepts the need for order in society, and for a government strong enough to maintain order; but in the final analysis liberty and diversity must be not merely tolerated, but actively nurtured. The diversity of life must be regarded as ‘a legitimate and proper part of the richness of life, not an unfortunate sign of disunity’.[3] Thus Mill seeks in his theory of government to balance the protection of individual liberty against the tyranny of the majority with the necessity for a system which permits the widest practical measure of participation and representation, as it is only through such a system that ‘the political education of a free people’ (OL, 109) so vital to the continuing progress and development of human society can take place.

Mill’s attempt to resolve this paradox is expressed in two ways. The first is through the system of constitutional checks and safeguards built into his conception of government. These are chiefly: a complex system of proportional representation, to prevent the majority from denying rights to the members of a minority; a method of plural voting, with the educated being entitled to extra votes, encouraging the development and influence of an intellectual elite, and preventing the ignorant from outweighing the informed; an efficient, professional and meritocratic civil service with a large measure of independent influence; and a representative assembly prevented from drafting or amending legislation. The purposes of the restrictions Mill envisaged for his assembly were to protect the implementation of laws from the influence of what he saw as the unstable and short-term interests of politicians and provide a barrier to the use of the governmental machine by one section of society, whether a majority or not, to override the views and interests of another.

The same themes are present in Mill’s general support for the principle of laissez-faire in government; but the issue of the extent of the acceptable sphere of operation for the government is, for Mill, a complex one. Ideally, it is clear, he would have all governmental involvement in the lives of the citizens kept to a bare minimum, but practically he recognises the necessity for some intervention. He accepts the principle of government enforcement of health and safety standards in employment, for example (OL, 95), and the need for intervention even in the ‘self-regarding’ social acts of individuals to prevent crime (OL, 96, 98).

The second form taken by Mill’s effort to reconcile government and individual spheres of action is determined by his conception of human nature. Individuals, not society, are his starting point, and throughout his political writings there is the underlying idea that, while individuals are natural, society is fundamentally an unnatural construction, one that men and women must accept with the bare minimum of compromise to their essential individual characters. Clearly, given his fears for the levelling effects of mass opinion, Mill believes that individuals have the potential to be radically effected by their membership of society and to be formed by its customs, habits, morality and beliefs; yet ultimately he feels that there is no impersonal assurance that any individual will feel him- or herself an organic member of any society – only education, crucially, can bring about that realisation.

It is on this point – the need for individuals to be educated and made politically mature members of society – that the chief paradox of Mill’s thought arises. For, while the individual’s liberty is supposedly paramount, the government under which he or she lives is not a remote, neutral, inactive institution; it must be a morally active agent seeking postively to develop each individual’s character. Thus, the government as concieved by Mill must encourage some acts and discourage others, despite his evident distaste for interventionism; this means some compromise of supposedly inalienable individual liberty. Mill’s fundamental idea seems to be that a government can intervene by following a policy of not intervening; too much activity on its part will clearly stunt individuality and initiative and prevent the development of the politically mature, educated citizenry that Mill sees as essential. It is a difficult balancing act, as Mill concedes – but one which will presumably become easier as the moral and intellectual quality of the people improves. Universal eduation is the key to this process, not provided by the state, but required by it; indeed, Mill makes it clear that a government must compel parents adequately to educate their children. This infringement of individual liberty is justified on the grounds that a father who does not ensure that his child is educated is himself denying that child its individual liberty; in the final analysis, it is the needs of the future which count for more with Mill than the liberty of each individual in the present.

It cannot be claimed for Mill that his concept of the balancing of individual, society and government is entirely satisfactory. The combination of a government based on widespread participation and progressive policies with the establishment of an intellectual and moral elite is unstable as a theoretical concept; and as a practical programme for government it was made irrelevant in nineteenth-century Britain by a development the nature and significance of which Mill entirely failed to appreciate, and indeed explicitly rejected – the rise of party politics.

* References to Mill’s works are given in round brackets with titles abbreviated as follows: OL=On Liberty, RG=Considerations on Representative Government. The page numbers given refer to the editions cited in the bibliography.

© Ralph Harrington 2005. This work is protected by copyright and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivative Works 3.0 Licence. This means that you can copy, distribute and transmit this work freely as long as it is attributed to the original author; you may not alter, transform or build upon this work; and you may not use this work for commercial purposes.

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Notes

1. G. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 595.

2. G. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 595.

3. A. Ryan, J. S. Mill, p. 130.

Bibliography

Works by Mill

On Liberty, ed. S. Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
On Representative Government, in John Stuart Mill: Three Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912; pbk. edn. 1975)

Some further reading

Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963; 2nd edn. 1990)

J. Gray & G. W. Smith, J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus (London: Routledge, 1991)

J. C. Rees, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985)

A. Ryan, J. S. Mill (London: Routledge, 1974)

G. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (London: Harrap, 1937; 3rd edn. 1951)

B. Semmel, John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984)

W. Thomas, Mill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985)